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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
RONNIE LEE GARDNER,
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Case No. 910500

v.
TAMARA HOLDEN, Warden
of the Utah State Prison,
State of Utah,

Category 3

Respondent-Appellant
and Cross-Appellee.
REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT
Petitioner-Appellee and Cross-Appellant Ronnie Lee Gardner
submits the following arguments and authorities, in addition to
those contained in his Opening Brief:
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT RULED CORRECTLY IN DETERMINING THAT MR.
GARDNER'S CLAIMS WERE NOT PROCEDURALLY BARRED AND IN DECIDING
TO REACH THEIR MERITS.
In the court below, the State argued that the district court

should not consider the issues raised by Mr. Gardner because they
were or could have been raised in his direct appeal.

After

briefing and argument, the district court granted summary judgment
on claims that had been included in the appeal.

The court ruled

that other issues were appropriately before it for resolution, and
decided them on their merits.
In its Notice of Appeal and Docketing Statement, the State did
not assign error to the district court's ruling on the procedural
issues.

Now, however, the State argues in its "Introduction to

Brief of Cross-Appellee" that this Court should reject these claims
as procedurally barred because they were not raised by former

counsel in Mr. Gardner's direct appeal. Legally and factually, the
State's argument lacks support.
Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure establishes
procedural rules for postconviction and habeas corpus proceedings.
Rule 65B must be construed "against the constitutional background
of the use of the Writ [of habeas corpus]."

Hurst v. Cook, 777

P.2d 1029, 1033 (Utah 1989). Rule 65B(i) incorporates the Uniform
Postconviction Procedure Act, which was intended to "liberalize
state habeas corpus proceedings and make them 'flexible enough so
that with sympathetic consideration of pleadings and methods of
presenting issues, a prisoner will always be able to raise his
claim in a state court."
As

a

general

777 P.2d at 1034.

matter,

postconviction

review

substitute for appellate review, and issues that could

should

not

have been

included in an appeal may not be raised in a habeas corpus or
postconviction

proceeding

except

in

unusual

Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983).

circumstances.
Justice Stewart

wrote separately in Codianna to emphasize that there were "numerous
Utah cases which have addressed the merits of habeas claims even
though the issues raised were known or should have been known to
petitioner and his counsel at the time of conviction and could have
been

raised

on

appeal."

660

P.2d

at

1114

(Stewart,

J.,

concurring).
In Hurst, the majority adopted Justice Stewart's reasoning and
held that "The general policy favoring the finality of judgments
cannot, therefore, always prevail against an attack by a writ of
2

habeas corpus.

As important as finality is# it does not have a

higher value than constitutional guarantees of liberty." 777 P.2d
at 1035.

The Court accordingly recognized that the failure to

raise a claim on appeal is not determinative.1
Here, the district court correctly concluded that Mr. Gardner
received ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal.

The facts

supporting this conclusion establish that exceptional circumstances
exist to excuse the failure to raise the claims here earlier. The
district court made the following findings of fact:
Mr. Ed Brass was appointed to replace the Salt Lake Legal
Defenders Association based on petitioner's claim he
received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and
on direct appeal. Mr. Brass filed a supplemental brief
arguing that there was no evidentiary record to frame the
issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. In addition,
it is not contested that Mr. Brass was appointed by the
Supreme Court's order, a copy of which order he claims
not to have received, to file a supplemental brief to
address matters not previously addressed. Consequently,
based on telephone conversation with Chief Justice Hall,
he understood he was appointed only to address the issue
of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Mr. Brass
claims to not have received a copy of its opinion.
A further problem exists.
The Supreme Court's order discharging the Salt Lake Legal
Defenders Association was not scrupulously honored.
Attorney Joan Watt testified she was instructed in an
informal telephone call from the Supreme court,s clerk to
file the appropriate documents in Mr. Gardner's behalf
after the decision affirming his conviction and sentence
was announced. Although the Supreme Court had decided
that he was entitled to independent counsel on the
1

In Hurst, the Court addressed the second petition filed
by the petitioner. The State argued that his second application
was procedurally barred because the issues should have been
included in the first petition. The petition here is Mr. Gardner's
first, rather than a successor petition, and the principles of
Hurst apply with even greater force. See also, Gerrish v. Barnes,
844 P.2d 315 (Utah 1992).
3

ineffective assistance issue, Ms. Watt also prepared the
Supplemental Petition for Rehearing and Supplemental
Reply to State's Response to Appellant's Petition for
Rehearing, which were signed and filed by Mr. Brass.
(Memorandum Decision, at 28) . These findings are supported by the
record, and the trial court properly decided to determine Mr.
Gardner's claims on their merits.
In

addition, the

State

also urges

this

Court

to

find

procedural default on the hypnosis claim, although it did not seek
summary judgment on this basis below.

In addition to the general

grounds for rejecting a procedural default defense to Mr. Gardner's
petition, there are specific reasons for refusing to apply it to
the hypnosis claim.

The State has waived a procedural default

defense by failing to seek dismissal on this basis below, and has
deprived Mr. Gardner and the trial court of their respective
ability to make argument or enter findings of fact on the issue.
This Court should address the hypnosis claim on its merits.
II.

MR. GARDNER RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT
TRIAL AND SENTENCING, ON THE GROUNDS ARGUED BELOW IN ADDITION
TO THE SIXTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS FOUND BY THE DISTRICT
COURT.2
A.

Conflict of Interest

According to the State, the advocate-witness rule does not
establish a conflict of interest in Mr. Gardner7s representation by
Andrew Valdez and James Valdez because the two lawyers were not
necessary witnesses. However, their observations at the scene did
not relate to issues which were "incidental or insignificant," but

Argument III in Mr. Gardner7s Opening Brief.
4

instead went to the heart of the defense counsel attempted to
present.
The State implies that counsel here were not necessary
witnesses under this Court7s decision in Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa
& Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (1991).

In Watkiss & Campbell, a legal

billing dispute, the Court addressed the admissibility of an
affidavit submitted by counsel for the defendant as to his opinion
that the plaintiff's bill was unreasonable.
noted "that

In fact, the Court

[the plaintiff] should have objected to

[defense

counsel's] continuing representation and that he should have been
disqualified."

808 P.2d at 1066 (emphasis added).

The evidence from counsel in Watkiss & Campbell addressed an
essential part of the defense there —
reasonable.

whether or not the fee was

Similarly, trial counsel's potential testimony here

also went to a crucial issue — the effects of Mr. Gardner's chest
wound.

As in Watkiss & Campbe11, representation by counsel who

were witnesses was not appropriate.
The State also relies upon State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204 (Utah
App. 1991).

In Hoyt, the appellant argued that trial counsel had

a conflict of interest because she had applied for a job in the
prosecutor's office.

However, the court of appeals rejected the

"implication ... that counsel might have been inclined to 'throw'
the trial so as to curry favor with the prosecution."
212, n.8.

806 P.2d at

According to the court, the appellant had not cited

anything in the record "which might suggest a demonstrable conflict
of interest."

806 P.2d at 212.
5

Here, however, the conflict of Mr. Gardner's trial counsel is
not a matter of speculation or implication.

Rather, it is

supported by the record and arises from the fact that they could
have testified in his defense.
The

necessity

and

relevance

of

counsel's

testimony

is

demonstrated by the fact that trial counsel sought to present
evidence from a witness who had seen him "shortly after he'd been
shot."

(H. 134). Brad Snow testified about his observations of

Mr. Gardner on the courthouse lawn.

(T. 2475, 2477).

This

testimony addressed the issues about which counsel could have been
witnesses, but was much weaker than their testimony would have
been.

The prosecution challenged this testimony based on the

distance between the witness and Mr. Gardner at the scene.

In

contrast, counsel's own contact with Mr. Gardner was much closer —
they talked to him, and heard his pleas to be taken to the
hospital.
In addition, the prosecution elicited evidence from police
officers at the scene, suggesting that Mr. Gardner was calm and
composed.3 Counsel's testimony could have countered this evidence.
Further, if they had not represented Mr. Gardner, James Valdez
would not have tainted the trial by attempting to testify through
the back door in cross-examination questions to a prosecution

3

It is interesting to note that the State continues to
rely on testimony from its witnesses that on the courthouse lawn
Mr. Gardner "had a blank facial expression, seemed calm and gave no
indication of pain (Tr. 2315-17, 2332). He smiled a couple of
times (Tr. 2071, 2333)." (Brief of Appellant and Cross-Appellee,
at 6) .
6

witness.

See T. 2340; United States v. Iorizzo, 786 F.2d 52, 57

(2nd Cir. 1986).
Trial counsel had

an actual conflict of

interest which

precluded their effective representation of Mr. Gardner. Yet, the
postconviction court ruled that "though there may be some evidence
of a conflict and as a result, some deficiency in representation,
because of the weight of the direct evidence of petitionees guilt,
there is no prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt."

As explained

earlier, Mr. Gardner was not required to demonstrate prejudice
under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

(Opening

Brief of Petitioner-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, at 31). Rather,
prejudice is presumed if an actual conflict of interest had any
adverse effect on counsel's representation.

The legal standard

applied by the court below was erroneous and should be corrected.
B.

Inadequate Representation
The State asks this Court to assume that when the district

court wrote that trial counsel's deficient actions were not
prejudicial beyond a reasonable doubt, the court actually meant
that any errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court
should reject this invitation.
The "harmless beyond reasonable doubt" standard is used to
determine whether constitutional errors are harmless, and is based
on Chapman v. Californiaf 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Neither Mr. Gardner
or the State cited Chapman in the district court on the issue of
ineffective assistance.
appropriate

in

assessing

In fact, the Chapman standard is not
ineffective
7

assistance

claims; the

prejudice standard from Strickland v. Washington must be applied.
Further, the postconviction court clearly applied the Chapman
standard on other issues, where it did control, and used explicit
language to do so.

With its complicated attempt to suggest that

the district court did not mean what it said, the State urges this
Court to ignore the written words which demonstrate that an
erroneous legal standard was applied below.

If the district

courts decision to grant relief on the basis that counsel were
ineffective in investigating and failing to obtain and present
mitigating evidence, this Court should reverse the determination
that Mr. Gardner did not establish prejudice on other ineffective
assistance issues.
Because of their deficient performance, recognized in part by
the district court, trial counsel did not effectively challenge the
State7s aggravating evidence and did not effectively present a
cohesive and understandable theory of mitigation.

In addition,

counsel's omissions in the guilt phase,4 prevented the presentation
of an adequate defense and resulted

in the

introduction of

inadmissible, prejudicial evidence against Mr. Gardner.

4

See Opening Brief of Petitioner-Appellee and CrossAppellant, at 38-43. Further, Mr. Gardner does not abandon his
claim that counsel were ineffective in failing to insure that a
complete record, including attorney-client disagreements and
requests that counsel withdraw.
This failure exacerbated and
obscured the difficulties that Mr. Gardner had with counsel, their
resulting
conflict
and
deficient
performance,
and
the
constitutionally detrimental effect on his trial.
8

III. MR. GARDNERS CONVICTION MUST BE VACATED BECAUSE IT WAS BASED
ON HYPNOTICALLY ENHANCED TESTIMONY.5
The State contends that Robert Maori's hypnotically enhanced
testimony at Mr. Gardner's trial was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt,

because

it

"was

not

critical

to

the

State's case."

According to the State, testimony from another person in the
clerk's office, Ed Seamons, diminished the importance of Mr.
Macri's evidence. However, Mr. Seamons was some distance away when
the door closed and the shot was fired, and his testimony was
contradictory.

(T. 2158-59, 2193, 2203, 2218-19, 2228).

The State also claims that testimony bearing on whether Mr.
Gardner was startled into firing the gun is irrelevant because of
"strong" evidence of his intent to kill. The State claims that the
intent to kill Mr. Burdell can be inferred from the facts that Mr.
Gardner planned an escape attempt, that he later shot a uniformed
bailiff and that he forced a bystander to accompany him as he
attempted to leave the building.

(Brief of Appellant and Cross-

Appellee, at 31) . These actions do not shed light on Mr. Gardner's
intent when he fired the shot.
Clearly, evidence that Mr. Gardner fired the gun in reaction
to a startling event was important to the defense that he did not
intend to kill Mr. Burdell.

Evidence explaining how the shooting

occurred also was relevant to the sentencing determination, because
the

change

in Mr. Macri's

testimony

affected

its potential

mitigating effect.

Argument IV in Mr. Gardner's Opening Brief.
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IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING AN INSTRUCTION THAT WOULD
HAVE INFORMED JURORS THAT THE PROSECUTION HAD TO ESTABLISH THE
EXISTENCE OF AN AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT.6
The State concedes that the need for a finding on the

existence of an aggravating circumstance is implied by the decision
in State v, Woods, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 988
(1982) .

However, the State contends that the denial of the

instruction requested here was not error because "No Utah case ...
has ever required that the jury be separately instructed that they
may only consider aggravation which they find to exist beyond a
reasonable doubt." (Brief of Appellant and Cross-Appellee, at 41) .
The State also argues that the federal constitution does not
require

the

prosecution

to

establish

the

existence

of

an

aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.
What rule required by the federal constitution is irrelevant
here — the Woods standard is not dictated by the Eighth Amendment,
and other states have been satisfied with a less rigorous scheme,
including some which place the burden of proof on the defendant to
show that mitigation outweighs aggravation.
the reasonable doubt standard

is derived

In Utah, the need for
from Woods and its

progeny, as a matter of state law.
As for the argument that no error occurred because the
instruction requested by the defense had never been commanded
before in a published decision, the State's argument appears to be
circular.

Trial courts also have the duty to interpret and apply

Argument IX in Mr. Gardner's Opening Brief.
10

the law and may not simply depend upon appellate courts to
pronounce the rule on every issue that arises in the course of
proceedings.

The instruction Mr. Gardner sought was logically

compelled by the Woods opinion; he was not required to wait until
some other case had explicitly announced that it was mandated.
Thus, the lack of a previous appellate opinion on this precise
issue is no answer.

The State does not argue the merits of Mr.

Gardner's contention that the instruction should have been given.
This Court should make explicit the rule that the existence of
aggravating circumstances must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
and should hold that the refusal to give the requested instruction
here requires a new sentencing hearing.
V.

MR. GARDNER'S RIGHTS TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL,
TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND TO A FAIR HEARING HAVE BEEN VIOLATED
BY THE DISTRICT COURTS REFUSAL TO APPOINT AN INVESTIGATOR AND
EXPERT WITNESSES TO ASSIST MR. GARDNER; THE REFUSAL TO PROVIDE
THIS ASSISTANCE IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINT ON MR.
GARDNERS ABILITY TO PRESENT HIS CASE.7
As it did below, the State disagrees with the district court's

conclusion Mr. Gardner adequately established the prejudice prong
of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland
v. Washingtonf 466 U.S. 668 (1984). This argument is based on the
State's assertion that "There is no evidence that petitioner
actually has organic brain syndrome."

(Reply Brief of Appellant,

at 11).
If this Court agrees with the State, any failure to present
evidence of Mr. Gardner's organic brain damage was the result of
7

Argument X in Mr. Gardner's Opening Brief.
11

the

court's

refusal

to

postconviction proceeding.

provide

expert

assistance

in

the

The dilemma faced by Mr. Gardner is

highlighted by the State's assertion in its brief that "The weight
of the evidence in the trial record indicates that petitioner does
not have organic brian syndrome."

(Reply Brief of Appellant, at

11) . It is clear from Dr. Heinbecker's testimony at trial and at
the postconviction hearing that adequate testing was not done to
evaluate organic brain damage, which was suggested by several
factors in Mr. Gardner's history.8

Yet Mr. Gardner cannot now

obtain the necessary tests because of the State's refusal to
provide expert assistance, and the failure to get them done when
help was available resulted only from trial counsel's deficient
performance.
Organic brain deficits are identified through specialized
tests which must be performed by medical and psychological experts.
It is fundamentally unfair to refuse to pay for evaluations by
these experts, and at the same time to urge that the lack of
evidence means that prejudice has not been established.

Under the

State's theory, postconviction relief could never be ordered for an
indigent petitioner on the basis of ineffective assistance where

8

According to Dr. Heinbecker's testimony at trial, these
factors were a bout with meningitis, a history of sniffing gasoline
and glue beginning at age 9, and a suggestion based on a BenderGestalt test conducted in 1972 Utah State Hospital that brain
damage was present. (T. 1577-78). In the testimony cited for the
State's assertion that Mr. Gardner does not have organic brain
syndrome, Dr. Heinbecker explained that statements in earlier
reports had not been supported by appropriate testing, or any
testing at all in some cases.
12

expert testimony is necessary to explain the prejudice caused by
counsel's inadequate performance.
The State argues that expert and investigative assistance was
not required by Utah statutes because the action below was civil
rather than criminal, and because it was discretionary.

The State

relies upon United States Supreme Court cases ruling that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel does not extend to state postconviction
proceedings.9
The

right

to

funding

for

experts

and

investigators

in

postconviction should not depend on whether the proceeding is
labeled "civil" or "criminal."
a

postconviction

character.10

proceeding

Despite this label, the nature of
is

essentially

"criminal"

in

A postconviction petitioner seeks relief from a

criminal conviction and

sentence, and the case requires the

application of substantive criminal law to claims that the original
criminal process was not conducted fairly.

9

In a leading case cited by the State, Murray v.
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989), the Court's opinion was joined by
four justices. Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion which
indicated that his agreement with the result was limited to the
"facts and record of this case." His opinion also emphasized that
"collateral relief proceedings are a central part of the review
process for prisoners sentenced to death," and that solutions to
the problem of death row access to the courts were being considered
by Congress and state legislatures.
In addition, it is worth noting that a 5-4 decision in
the United States Supreme Court is susceptible to being reversed.
See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2597 (1992) (reversing South
Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), and Booth v. Maryland,
482 U.S. 496 (1987).
10

Some states, whose procedures do not differ markedly from
Utah's, classify a postconviction petition as a "criminal" matter.
E.g., Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32, Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(c).
13

In any event, the State does not contend that Mr, Gardner does
not have the rights to due process, equal protection and access to
the courts because his conviction has been affirmed on direct
appeal.

As the Supreme Court has held:

The right of access to the courts ... is founded in the
due process clause and assures that no person will be
denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary
allegations
concerning
violations
of
fundamental
constitutional rights.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974).
385 U.S. 192

(1966)

££•_, Long v. Iowa.

(Equal protection right to state-funded

preparation of transcript in state postconviction proceedings);
Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (Equal protection right to
file state postconviction action without payment of filing fee).
It is fundamentally unfair to deny Mr. Gardner the ability to
respond meaningfully to the State's arguments and to prove his case
because he lacks the funds to pay for necessary
investigative

assistance.

To

remedy

expert and

the violations

of Mr.

Gardner's rights to due process of law, equal protection and access
to the courts, this Court should uphold the conclusion that a new
sentencing hearing and appeal are required.

Alternatively, this

matter should be remanded to the district court with orders to
reopen the case and to provide experts and investigators to assist
volunteer counsel in establishing that Mr. Gardner's conviction and
sentence were obtained in violation of the constitution and laws of
Utah and the United States.

14

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and authorities, in addition to
those contained in his Opening Brief, Mr. Gardner is entitled to a
new trial, sentencing hearing and appeal.11
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of June, 1993.
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On the claims not specifically addressed in this Reply
Brief, Mr. Gardner relies upon his opening Brief and does not waive
or abandon them.
15

